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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue1
A pressing problem faced by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

(“ECCC”) relates to the fitness of its defendants to stand trial. As expressed in both the
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea (“March Agreement”)2 and the Law of the Extraordinary Chambers (“LEC”),3 the
purpose of the ECCC is to prosecute those “most responsible” for past atrocities committed
under the Khmer Rouge. Part II discusses the factual background, or the atrocities committed
under the Khmer Rouge giving rise to the need for prosecution. Part III identifies six individuals
likely to stand trial before the ECCC and their prior roles in the Khmer Rouge: Nuon Chea, Ieng

1

The specific issue addressed relates to the possibility that the defendants brought before the ECCC will be elderly
and potentially in poor health. Consequently, the counsel for the accused may state that they are unfit to plead or
stand trial. Accordingly, this note shall address what factors related to the elderly such as age, memory loss, loss of
mental capacity, physical capacity, poor health, and other similar related conditions would or could affect their
fitness to stand trial. It makes both defense and prosecution arguments in citing and analyzing appropriate
supporting authority regarding the standards for fitness to stand trial and how these should be applied to ECCC
defendants.
2

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (“March Agreement”), Art. 1, June 6, 2003. (“The
purpose of the present Agreement is to regulate the cooperation between the United Nations and the Royal
Government of Cambodia in bringing to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most
responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and
custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia…”) [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook
One at Tab One].
3

Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (“LEC”), with inclusion of amendments as promulgated
on 27 October 2004, Article 1, NS/RKM/1004/006. (“The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of
Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian
penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that
were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.”).[Reproduced in the Accompanying
Notebook One at Tab Two].

1

Sary, Khieu Samphan, Kae Pok, Sou Met and Meah Mut.4 Had they not died, Pol Pot and Ta
Mok would also likely have faced prosecution.5 Part IV draws from international and American
jurisprudence in assessing defendant competency to stand trial, scrutinizing such issues including
the balancing of due process rights as they are affected by fitness to stand trial, involuntary
administration of medication, and the level of competency required for self-representation. Part
V identifies the main objectives of the ECCC, explaining how the need to expediently prosecute
these senior leaders as a means to achieving the goals of punishment may result in a lower
threshold for competency as compared to prior war crimes tribunals. Three specific objectives of
punishment are identified as particularly important to the ECCC: retribution, deterrence and
closure for victims and their families.
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. Due to the combination of the extremely old age of the defendants
and the egregious nature of the crimes with which they may be
charged, the ECCC should choose the lesser evil of affording a
potentially lower level of due process rights instead of losing the
opportunity to prosecute those most responsible.

Due to the effect of the defendants’ age on their competence to stand trial, due process
rights may be compromised during the proceedings in order to serve the higher purposes of
retribution, deterrence, and closure for victims and victims’ families. Although the LEC
incorporates Articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

4

See STEVEN HEDER AND BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, SEVEN CANDIDATES FOR PROSECUTION: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE
CRIMES OF THE KHMER ROUGE (War Crimes Research Office, 2001). This report provides a comprehensive and

thorough analysis for the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge, along with examining the culpability of the living
senior leaders discussed in this note: Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Kae Pok, Sou Met and Meah Mut.
[Reproduced in the Accompany Notebook One at Tab Three].
5

Alex Hinton, Khmer Rouge Leaders Must be Tried, GUELPH MERCURY, August 8, 2006. [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook One at Tab Four].

2

(“ICCPR”)6 to protect due process rights, defendants’ poor fitness may require the ECCC to
balance these rights with its own objectives of retribution, deterrence and closure. Standards for
competence to stand trial may be drawn from precedent, particularly from the International
Criminal Tribunal for Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). The ICTY Statute
affords defendants almost identical rights compared with Article 35 of the LEC.7 Further,
although not binding on the ECCC, American jurisprudence provides persuasive analysis for
approaching issues of competence. Because the United States Supreme Court has examined more
intricate issues of fitness than those addressed by the ICTY, such as the level of competence
necessary to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel, and the involuntary administration of
medication, its precedent may fill the gaps left by the ICTY.
ii. Defendants should not be permitted to represent themselves in trial
proceedings because this may result in the ECCC failing to prosecute
them.
Although both international law and American law recognize a criminal defendant’s right
to represent himself, this right is not absolute.
Due to the deteriorating physical health of the few potential defendants, the ECCC should
stipulate that every defendant chose or be assigned counsel in order to avoid procedural delays.
The ICTY Slobodan Milosevic trial demonstrates that if an aging defendant represents himself,
this likely creates numerous delays due to the defendant’s higher level of involvement in trial
proceedings. This creates particular problems when an elderly defendant exercises his right to
self-representation. As occurred in the Milosevic trial, affording the right to self-representation
may create such extensive delays that any of the elderly defendants before the ECCC may die
6

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 14 & 15. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook
One at Tab Five].
7

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended 19 May 2003 by Resolution
1481)(hereinafter “ICTY Statute.”)[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab Six.]

3

before the completion of their trial. Especially with the case of Nuon Chea, arguably the most
culpable of the potential defendants, this cannot be allowed to happen if the purposes of the
ECCC are to be properly served.
II.

Factual Background

The conflict in Cambodia occurred between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979, resulting
in some of the most horrific acts of violence in history.8 Under the Khmer Rouge’s brutal threeyear reign, at least 1.7 million persons were either systematically murdered or died of starvation.9
Overall, this estimate of the death toll constitutes approximately twenty percent of the April 1975
population of 7.3 to 7.5 million people.10 Not only were certain racial and ethnic groups
obliterated, but the Khmer Rouge targeted the educated as a class, murdering anyone it
discovered had completed a seventh grade education.11 Torture or death was the fate for all but
the peasant farmers, the only ones who were deemed “pure.”12 Doctors, lawyers, monks, teachers
and other professionals transformed overnight into farmers in futile attempts to escape the
murderous Khmer Rouge. 13 An examination of available data demonstrates a sharp disparity in
the percentage of targeted groups killed. While there was a one hundred percent death rate for
8

AARON J. BUCKLEY, THE CONFLICT IN CAMBODIA AND POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE in POST CONFLICT
JUSTICE, pg 635 (M. Cherif Bassouini, Ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002). [Reproduced in the
Accompanying Notebook One at Tab Seven].

9

Seth Mydans, Cambodia Approves Tribunal for Leaders of Khmer Rouge,, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, October 5, 2004;
available at 2004 WLNR 20947128. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab Eight].

10

STEPHEN R. RATNER AND JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, pg 276 (2 Ed. Oxford University Press, 2001). [Reproduced in the

Accompanying Notebook One at Tab Nine].
11

Mann (Mac) Bunyanunda, The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whither the Defense?, Southern California Law Review,
Vol. 74 at 1580 (2001); citing SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE, pg
119 (Basic Books, 2002). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab Ten].

12

Id. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab Ten].

13

Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?,
15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. Law 833, 844 (1998). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 11].

4

rural and urban ethnic Vietnamese, the death rate for urban and rural Khmer “new people” was
twenty-five percent and the death rate for rural Khmer “base people” was fifteen percent.14
Such atrocities do not reflect isolated acts of a new regime, but the Khmer Rouge’s
deliberate strategy to create a completely self-reliant and sovereign Khmer Rouge nation.15 The
driving force behind the Khmer Rouge’s purge of anyone vaguely associated with the toppled
Lon Nol regime was the belief that “a person who has been spoiled by a corrupt regime cannot
be reformed; he must be physically eliminated.”16 The week after the fall of Phnom Penh, the
Khmer Rouge evacuated an estimated two to three million Cambodians from their homes in an
orchestrated attempt to restructure the social, political and economic systems of the country. It
blamed the former regime for the evacuations despite clear documentation that Pol Pot and other
leaders planned them advance.17 Three decades later, the Khmer Rouge is associated only with
horror and atrocity, not the establishment of the “pure Khmer Rouge nation” that Pol Pot and
other senior leaders used, even years after the bloodshed, to justify their actions.
Despite the scale and brutality of the atrocities committed in Cambodia during the period
of Democratic Kampuchea, no efforts were made to prosecute the notorious members of the
Khmer Rouge.18 The first of the only two trials prior to the establishment of the ECCC was the
1979 “show” trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Both defendants were sentenced to death in

14

STEVEN R. RATNER AND JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, pg 276 (Oxford University Press, 2001). [Reproduced in the

Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 9].
15

Id at pg 268. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 9].

16

Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?
15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. Law 833, 846 (1998). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 11].

17

Supra, Buckley at pg 639. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 7].

18

Klosterman at 848. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 11].

5

absentia.19 The second, the 1997 trial of Pol Pot overseen by the Cambodian government,
occurred after Hun Sen took power through a coup. Pol Pot was sentenced to life imprisonment
for his crimes against the Cambodian people.20
III.

Six likely candidates stand before the ECCC.
A. Despite the uncertainty of the scope of the ECCC’s personal
jurisdiction, prosecution will likely focus on top Khmer Rouge
officials during the period of Democratic Kampuchea.

Article One of the March Agreement and Article One of the LEC identify “senior
leaders,” or “those most responsible,” as over whom the court has personal jurisdiction. The
focus of prosecution is thus unclear.21 Broad interpretation of both articles potentially allows the
prosecution of the indispensable mid-level actors who provided direct lines of communication
between the Central Committee and the ordinary cadre.22 Many of these perpetrators have been
reabsorbed into society, living quietly as farmers or even serving positions in the current
government.23 This creates the concern that their prosecution may cause civil unrest by uprooting
prominent members of the Cambodian government and society. A further consideration is the
potential practical and financial unfeasibility of prosecuting many of those involved in the

19

See Generally, BEN KIERNAN. THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER
(2 Ed. Yale University Press, 1996). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 12].

ROUGE, 1975-1979.
20

Elizabeth Becker, Videotape Shows Pol Pot Facing Khmer Rouge Justice, NEW YORK TIMES, July 29, 1997;
available at 1997 WLNR 4879907. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 13].

21

This particular line of analysis, which deserves a more thorough examination, falls outside the scope of this note.
For more discussion on this issue, see the memorandum submitted by Sean Morrison in Spring 2007 to the Office of
the Prosecutor of the ECCC.

22

Kelly Dawn Askin. Prosecuting Senior Leaders of Khmer Rouge Crimes. Justice Initiatives, pg 76 (April 2006).
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 14].

23

Seth Mydans, With No More Pol Pot, the New Khmer Rouge Hopes the World Will Forgive and Forget, NEW
April 20, 1998; available at 1998 WLNR 300681 [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at
Tab 15].
YORK TIMES,

6

Khmer Rouge atrocities. The ECCC would create a more substantive impact by narrowing its
scope of prosecution to those identifiable senior leaders attributed the greatest share of the
blame. A broader scope of investigation and prosecution may render the process unwieldy,
compromising the ECCC’s effectiveness.
Expressed intent by the United Nations and Cambodia shows that prosecution will likely
be narrow in scope. In establishing the ECCC, negotiations between Cambodia and the United
Nations expressed explicit and implicit intentions to limit prosecutions to a handful of senior
leaders and other notorious perpetrators of crimes. Discussion most notably focused on
prosecuting the leading cadre of the Phnom Penh torture center known as S-21, or Tuol Sleng.24
Tuol Sleng was essentially a school converted into a torture chamber. Of the limited existing
documentary evidence chronicling the atrocities committed under the Khmer Rouge, much of it
documents the horrors that occurred in Tuol Sleng. Evidence demonstrates that Tuol Sleng
“processed” close to at least twenty thousand individuals, suggesting the systematic or mass
nature of the killings.25 Of those “processed,” only seven survived to tell about it.26
One of the problems inherent in prosecuting these senior leaders nearly 30 years after
their crimes rests in locating credible witnesses willing to testify. Kang Khek Ieu (“Duch”), who
served as the chief of the Democratic Kampuchea national security apparatus and as the former
warden of the prison responsible for interrogations and executions, will likely provide evidence
of state action necessary to convict top leaders of the Khmer Rouge for crimes against

24

Steven Heder, The Senior Leaders and Those Most Responsible, Justice Initiatives, pg 54 (April 2006).
[Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab 16].

25

Mann Bunyanunda, The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whither the Defense?, Southern California Law Review, Vo.
74:1581, 1600 (2001). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook One at Tab Ten].
26

Nic Dunlop and Nate Thayer, Duch Confesses, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, May 6, 1999. [Reproduced in
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humanity.27 He has already proclaimed a willingness to testify against himself and other Khmer
Rouge leaders.28 As noted by Steven Heder, a Cambodia expert at London University’s School in
Oriental Studies, “Duch would in fact be in a key position to close key gaps in the evidence.”29
Further, as he is only in his early sixties, Duch may be able to provide a more thorough and
accurate account of the atrocities than the older defendants.30 On the flip side, Duch’s credibility
and motives are questionable due to his own role at Tuol Sleng. The veracity of his statements
have already been called into question due to his detailed account of meetings it is documented
that he did not attend.31
Duch, who was discovered after he gave a journalist an account of his remorse for his
actions under the Khmer Rouge, is the only former Khmer Rouge member currently in custody.32
Duch provides one example of a lower level official who may avoid prosecution by
incriminating those senior leaders the ECCC most wants to prosecute. Interviews with Duch
suggest that as he is now an evangelical Christian, his desire for repentance compels him to
cooperate with ECCC proceedings.33
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B. Of those still-living former top Khmer Rouge officials, scholars
have identified six individuals will likely face prosecution by
the ECCC.
A notable report by the War Crimes Research Office at American University and the
Coalition for International Justice identifies seven possible candidates for prosecution, six of
whom are still living.34
i. Nuon Chea
Commonly referred to as “Brother Number Two,” Nuon Chea served as deputy secretary
general of the ruling Communist Party of Kampuchea. He was responsible for all of the party’s
organizations and helped to oversee the national security police.35 He also occasionally acted as
prime minister for the Democratic Kampuchea government.36 He walked free after surrendering
to the Cambodian government in 1998.37
Of the remaining senior leaders, prosecuting Nuon Chea should be the ECCC’s first
priority. Journalist Nate Thayer, the last person to interview Pol Pot, describes Nuon Chea as
“probably more guilty for the actual killings that went on than Pol Pot himself.”38 As Duch will

34

STEVEN HEDER WITH BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, SEVEN CANDIDATES FOR PROSECUTION (War Crimes Research Office,
2001). Tok Mok, the seventh possible defendant identified, died subsequent to the publication of Heder’s and
Tittemore’s work. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook Two at Tab Three].
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36
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testify, while Pol Pot directed the search for “enemies within the party;” after 1975, Nuon Chea
assumed responsibility for the “waves of arrests of CPK members in Zone after Zone.”39 Despite
the mounting amounts of documentary evidence against him, Nuon Chea in a recent interview
expressed no repentance for his past, only pride for his reputation as a communist hard-liner.40 In
fact, he denies culpability, telling reporters that he does not regret the past because “[he] had
nothing to do with ordering the execution of anyone or even suggesting it.41 His lack of remorse
emphasizes the importance of enforcing respect for the law through punishment.
A procedural impediment, Nuon Chea’s current fitness may potentially affect his
competence to stand trial. As of 2002, the now age-eighty Nuon Chea suffers from respiratory
problems, which prevent him from speaking longer than a few minutes at a time.42 This could
potentially delay trial proceedings. One member of the police group assigned to guard Nuon
Chea’s palace claimed that his health was “serious;” recently worsening due to his illnesses
including diabetes and high blood pressure. He now remains in his home for self-treatment
supervised by his wife.43
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Despite health problems, Nuon Chea constantly reiterates a willingness to “go to court,”
even if he cannot walk there himself.44 Further, Nuon Chea is not universally observed as frail or
feeble- an interview as recent as August in 2006 found the former leader “surprisingly
healthy.”45 Because the defense raises the issue of competence to stand trial pursuant to
international standards,46 defense counsel may opt not to raise it at Nuon Chea’s request.
Nuon Chea’s willingness to stand trial, however, far from guarantees the smooth
proceeding of his trial. If Nuon Chea dies before prosecution, Cambodia loses the best means to
discovering details of the atrocities committed decades ago by the secretive Khmer Rouge,
devaluing the moral and monetary investment in the ECCC.
ii. Ieng Sary
Ieng Sary served as the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs during the
Period of Democratic Kampuchea.47
Along with Pol Pot, Ieng Sary was sentenced to death during a trial in absentia in 1979 on
charges of genocide and membership in the Khmer Rogue, which violated the 1994 Law on the
Outlawing of the Democratic Kampuchea Group.48 Overwhelmingly criticized as a “show trial,”
the trial represented one of the only efforts made to prosecute former Khmer Rouge officials
prior to the establishment of the ECCC. Ieng Sary was granted amnesty in 1996 following his

44
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defection from the party as part of the government’s campaign to obtain the defection of Khmer
Rogue guerillas.49
iii. Khieu Samphan
Khieu Samphan served as the Chairman of the DK State Presidium. He “defected” from
the Khmer Rouge Party with Nuon Chea in 1998.50 Available documentation points to
Samphan’s knowledge of CPK atrocities and suggests that he personally contributed to these
crimes by making public statements supporting the underlying policies and by monitoring the
manner in which regional and other authorities implemented them.51
iv. Kae Pok, Sou Met, and Meah Mut
Kae Pok served as a former Secretary of the North/Central Zone and member of the
Central Committee. Sou Met served as a chairman of the CPK Military Division, as did Meah
Mut.
C. The loss of other top Khmer Rouge officials demonstrates the
pressing need for expedient prosecution of those remaining.
The deaths of other leaders within the ECCC’s personal jurisdiction illustrate the stark
reality that others might also escape prosecution in this manner.
Most notoriously, Pol Pot, General Secretary of the Khmer Rouge and architect of the
killing fields, died while under house arrest of respiratory failure in 1998. He was seventy-three
years old.52 Suspicions remain that he was killed by his comrades.53
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Senior cadres Son Sen and Yun Yat, other potential defendants, also died before the
ECCC’s establishment.54 The former and his family were murdered under Pol Pot’s orders in
1997.
Commander Ke Pauk died in February of 2002,55 robbing Cambodians of the opportunity
to try a man who likely would have been indicted for crimes against humanity and genocide.56
Responsible for an estimated ten thousand deaths, Ke Pauk was sixty-eight years old, younger
than all of the senior leaders now facing potential charges.57
Most recently, potential defendant Tak Mok died on July 21, 2006. As the head of the
Southwest Zone and member of the Central Committee, Ta Mok played a central role in
implementing the Communist Party’s execution policies.58 On September 8, 1999, a Cambodian
military court charged Ta Mok with genocide subsequent to the Cambodian government
informing the U.N. Secretary-General that it intended to try Tak Mok before a Cambodian Court
under Cambodian law.59 Ta Mok was expected to be one of the first and most important
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defendants to be tried.60 After his 1999 capture in Anlong Venh, a former Khmer Rouge
stronghold near the Thai Border, Ta Mok spent seven years in a military prison in Phnom Penh,
waiting for prosecution.61 He died after suffering from a number of illnesses including high
blood pressure and stomach and respiratory problems.62
IV. LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. Due to the age and physical deterioration of
potential defendants, further delays in ECCC
proceedings could prevent potential defendants
from facing prosecution.
From the beginning, the process of establishing the ECCC was marked with delay. The
March Agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia on May 13, 2003, reflected years
of stalled negotiations.63 Four years later, no one has been charged, although scholars have
identified those former leaders likely facing indictment.64 Groups such as Human Rights Watch
believe that “political interference has brought the whole process to a screeching halt.”65 For
example, subsequent to a week of negotiations between the Cambodian and international judges
of the ECCC,66 Cambodian personnel acted on instruction from government officials to delay the
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adoption of internal rules for the ECCC.67 Because prosecutions cannot proceed without first
adopting internal rules of procedure, these delays may create serious problems. Failing to
expediently prosecute those “most responsible” may result in the inability to prosecute them at
all. Like Pol Pot and Ta Mok, the other likely candidates for prosecution: Nuon Chea, Khieu
Samphan, and Ieng Sary, whom are now age seventy-nine, seventy-seven, and seventy-six,
respectively, could die as free men, unjudged.68
Although health problems associated with age are not easily predictable, the age and
previous infirmities of individual potential defendants somewhat predict future health-related
problems. Of the four most prominent names that remain, three are now in their late seventies
and report having medical problems.69 Because many of the leaders fled to the jungle along the
border between Cambodia and Thailand, they now suffer from cerebral malaria and poor
health.70 Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that the ECCC prosecute those most responsible
lest it forever lose the opportunity.
B. The LEC does not explicitly require that its
defendants be competent to stand trial.
The LEC does not explicitly require that a defendant must be competent before he can
stand trial. The LEC enumerates defendants’ rights in Article 35.71 It incorporates the rights
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afforded to criminal defendants in Articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR,72 and it explicitly affords the
following guarantees:
a. to be informed promptly and in detail in a language that they understand of the nature and
cause of the charge against them;
b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defense and to
communicate with counsel of their own choosing;
c. to be tried without delay;
d. to be tried in their own presence and to defend themselves in person or with the
assistance of counsel of their own choosing, to be informed of this right and to have legal
assistance assigned to them free of charge if they do not have sufficient means to pay for
it; and
e. to examine evidence against them and obtain the presentation and examination of
evidence on their behalf under the same conditions as evidence against them.73
Article 35 of the LEC mirrors Article 21 of the ICTY Statute74 and Article 20 of the
ICTR Statute.75 Accordingly, the ECCC can benefit from the ICTY’s and ICTR’s interpretation
of the scope of defendants’ due process rights.
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C. The ECCC should follow ICTY precedent relating
to competence to stand trial.
i. The ECCC should adopt the ICTY’s definition of
competence and its position that the requirement of
competence to stand trial is inferred.
“International law” is not law in the traditional legislative or penal sense, but a symbiotic
fusion of law, politics and the competing interests of sovereignty. It is accepted by states as
required behavior due to treaty or custom.76 As international tribunals show consistency in
applying the same legal test for fitness to stand trial, the ECCC should adopt it also as a means to
establishing its legitimacy by respecting uniform international standards. The integrity of the
ECCC may otherwise be undermined, subject to the same criticism levied at the Nuremberg
trials and early ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In these proceedings, rules of
evidence and procedure were considered largely “technical,” and thus, to some extent,
dispensable.77
One decision of the ICTY Trial Chamber provides the most comprehensive framework
for defendant competence to stand trial. In The Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar,78 Trial Chamber II
formulated the legal test relative to assessing a defendant’s fitness to stand trial by analyzing the
capacities a defendant requires to effectively exercise his rights under Articles 20 and 21 of the
ICTY Statute. These include the following: to plead, to understand the nature of charges, to
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understand the course of the proceedings, to understand the details of the evidence, to instruct
counsel, to understand the consequences of the proceedings, and to testify.79
The Trial Chamber did not provide a bright-line test for holding a defendant incompetent.
It held that though fitness to stand trial is connected with a defendant’s physical and mental
condition, it is not confined to the presence of a given disorder: “The issue is not whether the
accused suffers from particular disorders, but rather is better approached by determining
whether he is able to exercise effectively his rights in the proceedings against him.”80
Although like the LEC, the ICTY Statute does not explicitly provide for a defendant’s
fitness to stand trial, the Trial Chamber found the provision of material assistance by way of
implication.81 It reasoned that the procedural rights afforded in Articles 20 and 21 presuppose
that a defendant has a level of mental and physical capacity with which to exercise them.82
Accordingly, the legal test it formulated was whether the accused can effectively exercise those
rights afforded him pursuant to Articles 20 and 21 of the ICTY statute. Similarly, in determining
defendant competence to stand trial, the ECCC should consider whether he can effectively
exercise the rights afforded to him in Article 35 of the LEC.
ICTY decisions subsequent to Strugar follow its precedent. In rejecting a defense motion
to declare a defendant unfit to stand trial,83 Prosecutor v. Vladimir Kovavic, for example,
emphasized Strugar’s point that the threshold test for fitness is whether the capacities to
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effectively exercise his rights are present at such a level that it is possible for the accused to
participate in the proceedings and to sufficiently exercise his rights- in other words, to make his
defense.84
Most recently, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanisic et. al. examined
whether a defendant’s medical condition compromised his right to a fair and expeditious trial
pursuant to Articles 20(1) and 21(4) of the ICTY Statute.85 Following the jurisprudence
established in Strugar, the Trial Chamber found that, by the “balance of probabilities,” the three
medical reports submitted by the defense did not demonstrate the defendant’s inability to
participate effectively in his defense; nor did it establish an “adequate reason” to hold an inquiry
into the defendant’s competence to stand trial.86
ii. The ECCC should rely on medical reports submitted by
experts as s means to assessing defendant competence.
The ICTY relies on medical reports submitted by experts to assess defendant fitness to
stand trial. For instance, in Prosecutor v. Vladimir Kovacevik, decided on April 12, 2006, the
Trial Chamber requested its medical experts and the leading psychologist responsible for the
defendant’s treatment to answer six questions related to his mental health.87 These questions, in
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effect, addressed whether the defendant could effectively exercise his rights protected in Article
21 of the ICTY Statute. These questions specifically addressed those due process rights afforded
in Article 35(a), (b), (d) and (e) of the LEC.88 They are, however, unfortunately publicly
unavailable due to confidentiality reasons. The Trial Chamber relied on the legal test for fitness
established in Strugar, but the reasoning of these experts’ conclusions used in applying this test
were omitted from the public version of the opinion.89
The obvious practical problem in requiring expert medical reports is time constraint.
Requiring expert medical opinion in order to assess competence delays proceedings regardless of
whether the experts conclude that a given defendant is fit to stand trial.
iii. As does the ICTY, the ECCC should delegate to the defense
the burden to prove, by the balance of probabilities, a
defendant’s incompetence to stand trial.
The defense bears the burden to prove a defendant unfit to stand trial.90 The standard of
that burden, “the balance of probabilities,” essentially requires it to be more likely than not that
the defendant is unfit to stand trial. This is the same standard applied to a defense of diminished
or lack of mental responsibility at the time a crime was committed.91
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D. The European Court on Human Rights’ similar
position on competence compared with the ICTY
strengthens its validity.
Similar to the ICTY’s position, the European Court on Human Rights holds that a
defendant is “unfit to plead” if by reason of a disability, he has “insufficient intellect to instruct
his solicitors and counsel, to plead to the indictment, to challenge jurors, to understand the
evidence, and to give evidence.”92 This parallels the legal test for fitness established in Strugar
and through American jurisprudence, suggesting its acceptance as an international norm.
As decided in T. v. United Kingdom, in which the court analyzed a juvenile’s fitness to
stand trial, “the question whether or not a defendant is fit to plead must be decided by a jury
upon the written or oral evidence of at least two medical experts.”93
The European Court holds that those rights enumerated in Article 6 of the European
Convention,94 which are identical to those afforded within the ICTY statute, “guarantee the right
of an accused to participate effectively in a criminal trial.”95 In Stanford v. The United Kingdom,
the European court ruled in favor of a criminal defendant who alleged violation under Article 6.
It found that a defendant’s inability to hear courtroom proceedings precluded him from
effectively participating in his trial. The court held that the rights contained within Article 6
implicitly guaranteed a defendant the right to effective participation: “to defend himself in
person;” “to examine or have examined witnesses;” and “to have the free assistance of an
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interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.”96 Accordingly, the
European Court applied the same logic used in Strugar to infer the granting of procedural due
process rights presupposes a level of mental and physical capacity with which to exercise them.
E. American jurisprudence, which addresses nuances
of the issue of competency not analyzed by
international courts, provides a useful guide for
addressing problems unique to the ECCC.
i. The United States Supreme Court holds a similar position
on the standard for competence and the burden of proof
compared with the ICTY.
American jurisprudence provides a useful guide for analyzing defendants’ due process
rights because it is often referred to in international decisions. Although not binding, American
norms of due process provide a useful yardstick to measure the integrity of trial proceedings. In
order for an international court to pursue justice in the most effective manner, these due process
norms should be as finely interwoven into the court’s procedure as possible.97
The United States Supreme Court (“Court”) holds that a defendant has the fundamental
right not to stand trial when it is more likely than not that he is incompetent.98 In Pate v.
Robinson, the Court found that not observing procedures adequate to protecting a defendant’s
right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process
right to a fair trial.99
The American test for incompetence is well-settled, set forth first in Dusky v. United
States in 1960. This test for competency is whether a defendant has “sufficient present ability to
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consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding…[and] a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”100 It is therefore substantially
similar to the test applied by the international tribunals.
The Court holds that a defendant found competent at the commencement of trial may
later be deemed incompetent as the proceedings continue. In Drope v. Missouri,101 the Court
warned trial courts to be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the
defendant unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial. Although the Court noted
the absence of fixed or immutable signs invariably indicating the need for further inquiry to
determine fitness to proceed, these may include the following: evidence of a defendant’s
irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand
trial.102 This may be particularly helpful to the ECCC proceedings, as problems arising due to old
age are often sudden and unpredictable. The issue of competence may arise during the ECCC
proceedings, rather than prior to their commencement.
Also like the ICTY, the Court holds that the defense bears the burden to prove, by the
preponderance of evidence, a defendant’s incompetence to stand trial.103 The burden is delegated
to the defense based on analysis of the limited scope of due process rights. Once a defendant is
provided access to procedures for evaluating competency, no basis remains for holding that due
process “further requires the State to assume the burden of vindicating the defendant’s
constitutional right by persuading the trier of fact that the defendant is competent to stand
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trial.”104 Obviously, requiring the State to first prove competence before commencing
proceedings would also create judicial gridlock, one impediment particularly dire to the ECCC
given the advanced age of its defendants.
Due to the significant impact of an erroneous decision of fitness, the defense bears the
lowest of three available standards of proof.105 If a defendant cannot effectively communicate
with counsel, he may be unable to exercise other rights deemed essential to a fair trial.106
ii. American jurisprudence provides guidance regarding the
standard for competence to waive counsel and to plead
guilty.
The ECCC may utilize the Court’s analysis of competence to other elements of trial
proceedings. In the United States, the same competence standard applies to pleading guilty and
waiving counsel as it does to standing trial.107 A criminal defendant may not waive his right to
counsel or plead guilty unless he does so “competently and intelligently.”108 In Godinez v. Moran
in 1993, the Court found that although the decision to plead guilty is a “profound one,” it found
no need to apply a standard higher than that applied in Dusky because higher level of competence
was not necessary to plead guilty compared with to stand trial.109 “[The decision to plead guilty]
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is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to
make during the course of a trial.”110
The Godinez court also found that waiving the right to counsel did not require a higher
level of competence. It found that a defendant may waive counsel at his own detriment, rejecting
the respondent-defendant’s argument that a higher standard for competence was necessary
because a pro se defendant required “greater powers of comprehension, judgment, and reason
than would be necessary to stand trial with the aid of an attorney.”111 The Court did not however,
resolve the issue of whether once a defendant chooses to represent himself, he is held to a higher
level of competence than a defendant assisted by counsel. The court distinguished between a
defendant’s right to waive counsel and his right to self-representation, noting that a criminal
defendant’s ability to represent himself does not bear on his ability to choose this selfrepresentation.112
iii. American jurisprudence provides persuasive analysis for
permitting the involuntary administration of medication to
aging defendants.
The Court also addressed whether a defendant may be administered medication in order
to render him competent for trial without offending his due process rights. Two Court cases laid
the framework to establish that the Constitution permits the government to involuntarily
administer antipsychotic drugs in order to render a mentally ill defendant competent to stand trial
on serious trials.113 The Court in Sell v. the United States in 2003 used this framework to outline
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the four requirements for the constitutionality of involuntary medication.114 First, an important
governmental interest must be at stake. Both serious crimes against a person and property qualify
as important governmental interests because the government seeks to protect through the
application of criminal law the basic human need for security.115 Secondly, involuntary
medication must significantly further state interests by the substantial likelihood that it will
render the defendant competent to stand trial.116 Third, involuntary medication must be
necessary to further important state interests because alternative, less intrusive treatments are
unlikely to achieve substantially the same results.117 Last, the administration of drugs is
medically appropriate, or in the patient’s best interest in light of his medical condition.118
All four requirements set forth in Sell can be met by administering medication to the
ECCC defendants. The exact analysis relating to these four requirements will vary from case to
case, but general comments can be made. First, prosecuting for crimes against humanity,
genocide and war crimes certainly qualifies as an “important governmental interest.”119
Secondly, medication administered to treat illnesses associated with advanced age will likely
improve defendants’ mental and physical condition, enabling them to stand trial. The challenge
is finding the least intrusive means of improving defendants’ fitness to the point that they can
competently stand trial. Last, given that the medication administered to defendants also improves
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their health, which is in their best interest, this constitutes a minor intrusion of liberty.
Administering involuntary medication to ECCC defendants may therefore pass constitutional
muster under Sell.
F. Defendants should not be afforded the right to selfrepresentation in order to serve the greater goal of,
and defendant right to, a fair and expedient trial.
i. Both international law and American law recognize a
criminal defendant’s right to self-representation.
International law recognizes a criminal defendant’s right to self-representation. Among
other international court statutes, the ICTY Statute,120 ICTR Statute,121 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court,122 and the European Convention on Human Rights123 all afford a
criminal defendant the right to self-representation.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes a criminal defendant’s right to selfrepresentation. In Faretta v. California, the Court held that natural reading of the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution implied a right of self-representation.124 In holding
that forcing a criminal defendant to accept a state-appointed public defender violates his
constitutional right to conduct his own defense, the Court stated: “This Court’s past recognition
of the right to self-representation, the federal-court authority holding the right to be of
constitutional dimension, and the state constitutions pointing to the right’s fundamental nature
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form a consensus not easily ignored.”125 In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that the
right to self-representation should be denied due to a defendant’s superior ability to defend
himself with counsel’s guidance compared to by his own ‘unskilled efforts:’ “But where the
defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a
lawyer’s training and experience can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly. To force a lawyer on
a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him.”126
The Supreme Court’s analysis is particularly applicable to ECCC defendants, as it is
uncertain whether defendants will be assigned attorneys from the international community or
from Cambodia. If, due to the unavailability of qualified attorneys in Cambodia, defendants are
assigned international counsel, defendants’ distrust of international attorneys may compel them
to assert the right to self-representation. Both Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan have expressed a
desire to represent themselves before the ECCC.127 As Nuon Chea stated in explaining his
reasons for potentially representing himself in the proceedings: “[International defense] lawyers
from the outside understand the law but they don’t understand us. They cannot explain our
actions.”128 Nuon Chea does, however, acknowledge his health as “his weakness” when it comes
to defending himself at trial, supporting the argument that rather than endure the countless delays
inevitable in allowing ECCC defendants to defend themselves, the ECCC should categorically
deny this right to serve the greater purpose of a fair and expedient trial.129
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ii. Both international law and American law acknowledge
that the right to self-representation is not absolute.
While international law recognizes a criminal defendant’s right to self-representation, it
acknowledges exceptions. For example, Rule 80(B) of the ICTY Rules on Procedure and
Evidence provides: “[A] Trial Chamber may order the removal of an accused from the courtroom
and continue the proceedings in the absence of the accused if the accused has persisted in
disruptive conduct following a warning that such conduct may warrant the removal of the
accused from the classroom.”130
Two specific cases from the ICTR and ICTY illustrate the limits to the right to selfrepresentation. Only one case brought before the ICTR alluded to the imposition of defense
counsel, in the context of a request for replacement or withdrawal of counsel. In Prosecutor v.
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, the defendant refused to appear in court and instructed his counsel not
to represent him in any respect in the trial. In finding that the defendant was boycotting the trial
and obstructing the course of justice, the Trial Chamber denied allowing the withdrawal of
counsel.131
Even more on point, the ICTY has addressed the issue of the right to self-representation
in arguably its most famous case, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic.132 The first case before the
ICTY to address self-representation, the issue arose primarily because the deteriorating health of
the aging defendant constantly called into question his ability to represent himself. This is the
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case the ECCC should keep in mind when deciding whether defendants should be allowed
to exercise the right to self-representation. In Milosevic, trial proceedings commenced on
February 12, 2002, and terminated on March 14, 2005 upon Milosevic’s death on March 11,
2005.133 The ICTY Trial Chamber early on recognized Milosevic’s right to represent himself.134
Milosevic’s adamant insistence on exercising this right, combined with Milosevic’s continuously
poor health, created such delay that the Trial Chamber on September 22, 2004 granted the
prosecution’s motion to assign counsel to Milosevic.135 During the two-year presentation of the
Prosecution’s case, proceedings were suspended thirteen times due to Milosevic’s ill health, for a
total of 66 days. While the commencement of the defense case was initially scheduled for June 8,
2004, further delays due to Milosevic’s poor health caused its postponement until August 31,
2004. Milosevic died before a decision was handed down.
In its decision to assign defense counsel, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Milosevic provided
precedent potentially helpful to the ECCC. If the ECCC’s aging defendants choose to exercise
their right to represent themselves, the similar circumstances may provide a useful framework for
deciding whether to grant this request. The ICTY Chamber specifically addressed the issue of
whether the right of an accused set out in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute to defend himself in
person is subject to qualification; and, if it is, whether the circumstances warranted assigning
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counsel to Milosevic. In holding that counsel should be assigned to the defense, the Trial
Chamber stated:
The fundamental duty of the Trial Chamber is to ensure that the trial is fair and
expeditious. The concern of the Chamber is that, based on the medical reports, there is a
real danger that this trial might either last for an unreasonably long time or, worse yet,
might not be concluded should the accused continue to represent himself with the
assistance of counsel. On the other hand, the Chamber is satisfied that, if counsel is
assigned to the accused, measures can be devised to ensure that the trial continues in a
manner that it both fair and expeditious.136
In holding that Milosevic’s right to self-presentation was not absolute, the Court found
that allowing the ailing former leader would violate another right afforded under Article 21 of
the ICTY Statute: the right to a fair trial .137
[The Trial Chamber] is not obliged to indulge the wish of an accused to conduct his own
defense where his capacity to do so is so impaired that, were he to continue to do so,
there would be a material risk that he would not receive a fair trial. The mere assertion on
the part of the Accused of his right to defend himself does not ensure an effective defense
in circumstances where he is seriously ill and regularly prevented for protracted periods
from acting in his own defense.138
In essence, the Trial Chamber specifically held that the right to represent oneself must
yield when it is necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.139 It relied on the jurisprudence of past
tribunals, including the ICTY, ICTR, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in reaching the
conclusion that there may be circumstances when it is competent and appropriate for a Trial
Chamber to insist that the defense is presented by counsel and not by the accused in person.140

136

The Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 1,, Case No. IT-0254-T (September 22, 2004). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook Three at Tab 63].
137

ICTY Statute, Art. 21. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook Three at Tab 6].

138

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, para. 32, Case No. IT-02-54T (September 22, 2004). [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook Three at Tab 63].
139

Id. at para. 34. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook Three at Tab 63].

140

Id. at para 35. [Reproduced in the Accompanying Notebook Three at Tab 63].

31

Allowing an ECCC defendant to exercise his right to represent himself creates two
problems. One, his fitness would come more into play. As assistance of counsel would not be
present, the level of fitness necessary for a fair trial would increase. Secondly, and correlatively,
problems associated with fitness become more likely to delay court proceedings, potentially
denying a defendant his right “to be tried without delay.”141 Accordingly, like the ICTY Trial
Chamber previously decided in the Milosevic, the ECCC should stipulate that a defendant’s right
to fair and expedient trials outweighs his right to represent himself.142 Because the right to
defend oneself is recognized as non-absolute, and due to the ECCC’s prerogative of trying a
defendant before his death, the right to self-defend should give way to these other concerns.
V.

THE PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT ARE BETTER SERVED IF THE ECCC
APPLIES A MORE LIBERAL STANDARD FOR COMPETENCE IN ORDER TO
ASSURE ITS DEFENDANTS ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR ROLE IN
THE KHMER ROUGE ATROCITIES.
Ideally, the ECCC would be able to seamlessly apply standards derived from American

and international jurisprudence, affording the due process guarantees outlined in Article 35
without impeding the ECCC’s ability to efficiently and justly prosecute those “most
responsible.” The reality, however, is that due to the passage of time since the period of
Democratic Kampuchea, the ECCC may be engaged more in a balancing of due process rights
compared with granting due process rights. Due to the advanced age of the defendants, the
ECCC must balance the implied right to be competent to stand trial with other rights afforded in
Article 35 of the LEC such as the rights to a fair and expedient trial.143
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Although punishment serves numerous purposes, three stand out as major objectives of
the ECCC: retribution, deterrence, and closure. As noted by other war crimes tribunals,
retribution and deterrence are generally the two primary purposes of punishing war criminals.144
Closure is important due to the length of time victims and their families have waited for answers
regarding the operation of the Khmer Rouge.
A. Retribution
The theory of retribution rests on the basic premise that the infliction of punishment
rectifies the moral balance insofar that punishment is what the perpetrator deserves. “A sentence
must reflect the predominant standard of proportionality between the gravity of the offense and
the degree of responsibility of the offender.”145 The ICTY and ICTR have both recognized
retribution, along with deterrence, as the primary purpose of punishment.146 For Cambodians,
retribution is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental purposes of trying former leaders of the
Khmer Rouge, simply due to the length of time the leaders have been allowed to live freely in
Cambodia without facing consequences for their actions.
Relating to Cambodia, a fundamental problem from a retributive perspective is the fact
that while many were responsible for crimes and atrocities committed during the period of
Democratic Kampuchea, the LEC provides only for the punishment of “senior leaders” and
“those most responsible.”147 One could argue that this selective mode of punishment undermines
the retributive function of punishment.
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While it may appear that others who committed crimes during that area are “getting
away” with their acts, the reality is that prosecution of all persons responsible is economically
and practically unfeasible. In contrast, prosecuting those who actually orchestrated the killings is
the first priority from a retributive perspective. Leaders and those in superior positions in the
chain of command are, owing to their positive governance obligations, more deserving of
prosecution and weightier punishment for their involvement in mass atrocity.148 It should be
cautioned, however, that although selective prosecution and the use of “exemplary trials” are
accepted in virtually all legal systems, one risk is arbitrariness in selection. As noted by Michael
P. Scharf, director of the Frederick K. Cox Center of International Law at Case Western Reserve
University, to avoid this risk, the criteria used must reflect appropriate distinctions based upon
degrees of culpability, sufficiency of evidence, and other relevant factors.149 Accordingly, the
ECCC’s prosecution of those “most responsible” should focus on those the evidence suggests
bear the highest degrees of culpability.
Here, the retributive purpose of punishment may be undermined if a defendant does not
have proper capacity to defend himself. Since every defendant is presumed innocent as long as a
court has not given a definitive judgment,150 one cannot assume that those leaders “most
responsible” are guilty until they are proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, as
ECCC defendants theoretically should be afforded the same rights as a defendant ultimately
absolved of all responsibility.
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At the same time, however, substantial documentary evidence implicates those few the
ECCC will choose to prosecute as “most responsible.” Due to the extreme likelihood that these
individuals are actually guilty of the crimes of which they are accused, the ECCC may opt to not
necessarily lower the standard previously applied by other war crimes tribunals, but to be more
liberal in its perception of defendant capability to effectively contribute to their defense. At the
same time, however, the ECCC must face the reality that the physical and mental deterioration
associated with old age may delay its proceedings. Accordingly, the best way to address these
potential problems is to anticipate them, looking to past precedent, particularly the Milosevic
debacle, to determine whether there were particular mistakes or reasons for delay that the ECCC
could take care to prevent.
B. Deterrence
From a deterrence perspective, punishment is inflicted not because the offender deserves
it, but because of the utilitarian and consequentialist effect of that punishment: reducing
recidivism, or re-offending by the perpetrator.151 As the judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, who
presided over the ICTY’s first trial, stated: “We are here to tell people that the rule of law is to be
respected.” In Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, the ICTR noted that in addition to retribution, the
punishment of an accused must be directed “over and above….as a deterrence, namely to
dissuade forever, others who may be tempted in the future to perpetrate such atrocities by
showing them that the international community shall not tolerate the serious violations of
international and humanitarian law and human rights.”152 As the United Nations Commission on
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Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorites have concluded, impunity is one of the main reasons for the continuing of grave
violations of human rights throughout the world.153 Rather than reinforcing respect for the law
and the government, failing to prosecute former senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge breeds
contempt for the law and encourages future violations.
As scholar Diane Pokempner gleaned from interviews with Cambodians during the
summers of July 2001 and March 2002, for some Cambodians, the value of the ECCC is
primarily symbolic and prospective- a warning sign to the present order. The idea they hope it
will convey is that at some point, even the highest leaders could be called into account for their
crimes.154
There are two different types of deterrence: general and specific. Specific deterrence,
which focuses on the goal of ensuring that the particular offender does not recidivate, has not
been a focus of the international war crimes tribunals because “the likelihood of persons
convicted…ever again being faced with an opportunity to commit war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, or grave breaches is so remote as to render its consideration [in sentencing]
unreasonable and unfair.”155 Rather, international war crimes tribunals place specific emphasis
on general deterrence.156 In Cambodia’s case, the prevention of crimes on the same scale as those
committed by Khmer Rouge officials constitutes general deterrence.
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Deterrence plays a central purpose in ECCC prosecutions. Cambodia is characterized by
a “culture of impunity,” in which officials, for the most part, remain immune from consequences
for their actions. As noted by Pokempner: “There is also the present-day impunity, codified in
law and in practice, of almost any Cambodian official for wrongdoing against those who are
weaker.”157 By prosecuting those who, until now, were permitted to hide safely in the woodwork
of modern society, this clearly conveys the message that further acts of violence will not be
tolerated, better enabling Cambodia to reach its end goals of peace and a structured legal system.
Already, the purpose of deterrence is undermined by the deaths of other “senior leaders”
before their prosecution. Although unlikely that atrocities at the level of those committed by the
Khmer Rouge will occur again, Cambodia remains plagued with crimes for which officials are
not held accountable and its culture of impunity. Accordingly, to promote deterrence, the trials
should proceed in order to enable Cambodia to transition to a peaceful society. Allowing senior
leaders to die before they are held accountable holds irresponsible those actually “most
responsible”
C. Closure
The ECCC is unique because it will prosecute crimes that potentially occurred over three
decades ago. On one hand, one might assume that this passage of time diminishes the importance
of closure for several reasons. First, due to the massive scope of the genocide, which eliminated
a significant portion of the population, investigating every victim is impossible. Second, as the
hope that a loved one may be alive has been extinguished over the last thirty years, family
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members of victims no longer need to see their names in writing to confirm their deaths. Third,
because such a long time period has passed since the atrocities occurred, Cambodians no longer
have as pressing a need to have their stories heard and legitimized.158
On the other hand, the absolute failure for either the international community or the
Cambodian government to assign responsibility creates a pressing need for closure for
Cambodian citizens. This delay in prosecution is due partially to the Khmer Rouge’s adeptness at
disguising chains of command and concealing the truth regarding the orchestration of the
genocidal regime.159 When the Khmer Rouge fled the Capital, it left behind more than half a
million documents chronicling their killings of fellow Cambodians.160 In a survey of
Cambodians, almost one hundred percent of those surveyed wanted to know the truth behind the
horrific acts that occurred during the period of Khmer Rouge.161 The ECCC proceedings
represent a long-awaited response to Cambodians’ desire for closure through the establishment
of a thorough and accurate historical record.
One question necessarily raised in prosecuting only a select few officials is whether
omitting to prosecute others will prevent the obtainment of a thorough historical record. The
unfortunate reality is that although the documentary record pointing to the role of specific
individuals is quite extensive for some atrocities, particularly the operation of the interrogation
centre of Tuol Sleng, documentary evidence directly implicating individuals in other atrocities is
unavailable due to the uneven nature of record-keeping in Democratic Kampuchea and the loss
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of many documents since 1979.162 As the Group of Experts appointed by the United Nations
concluded subsequent to its investigation in Cambodia in 1998, trying only a select few is
prudent for three major reasons. First, trying numerous high-level officials would be “logistically
and financially impossible for any sort of tribunal that respects the due process rights of
defendants. Second, reopening the events through criminal trials on a massive scale would
impede the national reconciliation important to Cambodia. Third, the legal questions surrounding
the responsibility of many persons at the low levels, particularly the youthful offenders, and
complex and suggests that these persons should not be tried.163 Accordingly, although some may
argue that trying a few senior leaders may not provide the thorough historical record necessary to
achieve closure, this represents the best means possible.
The ECCC proceedings may serve as a means for transitioning Cambodia to a forwardlooking society rather than one focused upon the past. By acknowledging and accounting for past
crimes under the Khmer Rouge, the ECCC removes the uncertainty that has plagued Cambodians
for generations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the ECCC cannot control its greatest obstacle to effectively prosecuting
those within its personal jurisdiction: the advanced age of its defendants. Through examining
international and American jurisprudence, however, the ECCC may find effective means to
addressing those problems associated with defendants’ old age rather than risk losing the
opportunity to prosecute them. Most importantly, ECCC defendants must not be permitted to
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defend themselves due to the inevitable delays this creates. Although some may criticize this as
violating due process rights afforded under Article 35 of the LEC, substantial evidence
demonstrates that automatically assigning counsel serves the greater objective of granting
defendants a fair and expedient trial.
Relating to the other nuances and issues arising regarding defendant competency to stand
trial, international and American jurisprudence provides a useful blueprint to guide the ECCC in
addressing potential problems and concerns. The ECCC’s overarching objective, however,
should be to use this jurisprudence, particularly that from the Milosevic trial. It can learn from
the mistakes of the past to prevent the unnecessary delays which would prohibit those most
responsible from being held accountable for their actions.
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